Time Series Analysis of Big Data for Electricity Price and Demand to
  Find Cyber-Attacks part 2: Decomposition Analysis by Rakhshandehroo, Mohsen & Rajabdorri, Mohammad
^ 
^ 
 ^
 ^
− 
^ ^  ^
^ 
 ^
St for each season, take the average for the 
de-trended values for that season. For example, for weekly 
t 
^ × 
Time Series Analysis of Big Data for Electricity 
Price and Demand to Find Cyber-Attacks part 2: 
Decomposition Analysis 
 
1st Mohsen Rakhshandehroo 
Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Shiraz University 
Shiraz,  Iran 
mohsenrakhshandehroo@gmail.com 
2nd Mohammad Rajabdorri 
Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Shiraz University 
Shiraz, Iran 
Rajabdorri@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Abstract—In this paper, in following of the first part (which 
ADF tests using ACI evaluation) has conducted, Time Series 
(TSs) are analyzed using decomposition analysis. In  fact, TSs 
are composed of four components including trend (long term be- 
haviour or progression of series), cyclic component (non-periodic 
fluctuation behaviour which are usually long term), seasonal 
component (periodic fluctuations due to seasonal variations like 
temperature, weather condition and etc.) and error term. For 
our case of cyber-attack detection, in this paper, two common 
In (1), St is the seasonal, Tt is the trend-cycle and Rt is 
residual components. Before discussing about AD, it must 
be mentioned that if TS is daily moving average (m) is 
considered to be m  =  7 and if TS is monthly m  =  12  
and if data is seasonal m = 4. Considering aforementioned 
explanation the AD steps are as follows: 
1. If   m   is   an   even   number,   the   trend-cycle   T^   is   2  × 
ways of TS decomposition are investigated. The first method is 
additive decomposition and the second is multiplicative method 
to decompose a TS into its components. After decomposition, the 
error term is tested using Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey 
test to see whether the error follows any predictable pattern, it 
can be concluded that there is a chance of cyber-attack to the 
system. 
Index Terms—cyber-security, machine learning, time-series 
analysis, cyber-attacks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, to find out that TS errors (or called residual’s 
interchangeably)follows any particular patterns or not and to 
obtain the residual values of TSs, we conducted two classical 
methods of TS decomposition and then we analyzed the 
residual terms of TSs for both decomposition method to find 
anomaly in residual distributions. To evaluate the TS residual 
values, Durbin-Watson (DW) and Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test 
as well as visualization method are applied [1] - [7]. 
II. TIME-SERIES DECOMPOSITION 
Generally, there are plenty of time-series decomposition 
methods  that  have  been  proposed  in  the  field  literature [8] 
- [16]. Among those methods, there are two classical and  well 
known industrial applicable methods: additive and  multiplica- 
(moving average(m)) and if m an odd number then T = 
(moving average(m)) 
2. De-trend the Ts  using yt T 
3. To obtain the St for each season, take the average for the 
de-trended values for that season. For example, for weekly 
data, St for the first week is the average of de-trended values 
of first weeks in TS. 
4. The residual values will be [18]: 
 
Rt = yt − Tt − St (2) 
B. Multiplicative Decomposition (MD) of TSs 
In this model, TS is considered to be as (3): 
 
yt = St × Tt × Rt (3) 
Like AD method, the corresponding steps for MD are as 
follows: 
1. If m is an even number, the trend-cycle T is  2  
(moving average(m)) and if m an odd number then T = 
(moving average(m)) 
2. De-trend the TS using yt  
tive. In following both are described. 
 
 
3. To obtain the ^ 
Tˆ t 
 
 
In this model, the TS yt is considered to be consists of 
components including trend, seasonal and residual (errors) 
term. This model can be formulated as follows [17]: 
data, St for the first week is the average of de-trended values 
of first weeks in TS. 
4. The residual value is as: 
 
yt 
yt = St + Tt + Rt (1) R^t  = T^  S^
 (4) 
A. Additive Decomposition (AD) of TSs 
A. Additive Decomposition (AD) of TSs 
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Based on (8), and considering ρ = cor(ε , ε 
t t t 
t=2(εt − εt−1) 
ypothesis tests, 
III. SERIAL CORRECTION (AUTO CORRECTION) OF 
RESIDUAL VALUES 
2. For positive auto correlation MSE estimate of residual 
variance will underestimate. 
No matter which method is used to gain the ρ, but DW 
In this section, serial correction (which is also known as 
error auto-correlation), is analyzed. It must be noted that statistic can be approximated as below (it must be noted that  
is the most common way): 
if  the  residual  values  Rt  of  TS  doesn’t  follow  the normal 
distribution, then there is anomaly in data. To ensure that there 
is no auto correction in error, there are two well known tests 
 
ρ^  = cor(εt, εt−1) 
DW  c 2(1 − ρ^) 
 
(8) 
 
 
 
two are introduced. 
 
three restrict conditions: 
^ t t−1 
A. Durbin-Watson (DW) Test 
On eof the most common tests to find out the randomness of 
error term is DW test. Consider the first order auto-regression 
model (from the part 1 of this paper), we have yt = α0 + 
γyt−1+εt. If the error term is not random, then it is reasonable 
to assume that there is a correlation between error at the time 
t and the first lag of errors as follows: 
εt = ρεt−1 + Ut,   Ut ∼  N (0, δ2) :: d (5) 
Under DW test, the hypothesis is as follows: 
1. ρ = 1 → DW = 0 (it means the most positive first order 
2. ρ = 0 → DW = 2 (It means there is no auto correlation) 
3. ρ = −1 → DW = 4 (It means the most first order of auto 
 
1) Removing the Auto Correlation from TS: To remove the 
auto-correlation of order 1, it needs to transform the TS by  
the following equation, consider the AR(1) model as: 
 
yt = β0 + β1xt + εt (9a) 
. 
H0 : ρ = 0  
(6) 
 
ε = ρε 
 
+ U  ,   U (0, δ2) (9b) 
Equation (6) emphasizes that under the Null hypothesize, 
there is no auto-correlation between errors, however the H, 
shows the auto-correlation. Based on DW test, the DW statistic 
Let’s define the transformed variables as below (xt in the  
TS is yt−1): 
is defined as follows [24]: 
Σn 2 
 
 
  
yt
j  = yt − ρyt−1 βj = β0(1 − ρ) 
xjt  = xt  − ρxt−1 β1
j  = β1 
 
 
(10) 
 
  
 
 
If DW  test is less than a critical value, the we reject the  
H0, which means there is auto-correlation between error term 
and their first lag and thus, there is possibility of cyber-attacks 
toward the electricity grid. As an intuition to DW statistic, it 
can be mentioned that if we have auto-correlation, the next 
error term would be as similar as the current error term, 
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + εt (11) 
 
yt−1 = β0 + β1yt−2 + εt−1 (12) 
therefore the (εt−εt−1)2 would be a small value. In contrast, if 
the error term is random, (ε  − ε )2 in general is a big term. εt = ρεt−1 + Vt, Vt ∼ (0, δ ) (13) 
Unlike  the common h 
t t−1 
there is not a certain 
critical value for DW statistic [25] - [26]. But instead, there 
are upper du and lower dl critical values so that: 
-DW  statistic > du we cannot reject H0 
-DW  statistic < dl we reject H0 and conclude H1 
-dl  <  D < du we cannot include eighter auto-correlation 
or randomness. 
DW test only checks the first lag auto-correlation and longer 
lags  are  not  considered.  It  is  proven  that  DW  statistic  
2(1 ρ) and as a role of thumb it can be concluded: 
-for DW statistic greater than 2, there is no auto-correlation 
(we cannot reject H0 
-for DW close to zero, there is perfect auto-correlation in 
errors. 
The auto correlation consequences can be listed as below: 
1. Regression coefficients remain unbiased, but are not longer 
minimum variance estimates. 
Multiplying (12) by ρ and subtracting from (11), we will 
have: 
 
yt − ρyt−1 = β0(1 − ρ) + β1(yt−1 − ρyt−2) + εt − ρεt−1 (14) 
The last towo terms in (14) would be the equal to Ut which 
follows he normal distribution and we can then run the LS to 
find the β0, β0, β1 and Ut. The flowchart for the DW test and 
transformed TS is show in Fig. [1] 
Considering the DW test there are major drawbacks that can 
be listed as follows; 
1. DW interpretation is hard and complicated 
2. ρ is inconsistent even for large samples 
3. DW only considers the auto correlation of order 1. 
Regrading the above-mentioned condition, there is another 
comprehensive statistical test for auto correlation in the next 
section. 
In case of AR(1) model for the TS the transformation would (7) 
(εt)2 
n 
t=1 
DW = 
be as: (εt)
2 
n 
t=1 
DW = 
, there are 
that can be implemented on data [19] - [23]. In following these 
. 
H1 : ρ ƒ= 0 or ρ < 0 t−1 
 ^k 
k 
k 
k 
εt = Y  + sxt + ρ1εt−1 + ρ2εˆt−2 + ... + ρk εˆt−k + Ut   (15) ^  ˆ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. DW Test and Transformed TS 
 
 
B. Breusch-Godfrey or (LM) Test 
In this model, we use an auxiliary regression equation for 
modelling the error. To run the LM test, the step by step 
procedure is as follows: 
1) Estimate yt = α + βxt)+εt   by ordinary least square method 
2) Obtain the residuals εt 
3) Run an auxiliary regression as follows; 
 
 
Since in (15), it is considered that xt is exogenous regressor, 
so it doesn’t influence on ρ1, ..., ρk. So the test hypothesis is 
as follows: 
4) Form the test hypothesis as; 
Fig. 2. AD decomposition for the real-time prices for ISONE. 
 
 
Fig. 3. MD decomposition for the real-time demand for ISONE. 
 
degree of freedom, then we cannot reject Null hypothesis and 
there is no auto-correlation. 
As a good rule of thumb choosing the k can be based on 
seasonality of your data, if the data is seasonal k = 4, if daily 
k = 7 and if monthly k = 12 are good estimation. However, 
Akaike information criteria (AIC) can be applied as explained 
in the first part of this paper. 
IV. RESULTS FOR NEW ENGLAND BIG DATA 
In this section, first electricity price and demand for 9 
different operational zones of NE are decomposed using both 
AD and MD methods. Then DW and GB test are applied to 
these data to find possible auto-correlation as source of cyber- 
.
H0 :   ρ1 = ρ2 = ... = ρk = 0  or   R2 = 0 
 
 
 
(16) 
attack to the system. 
 
 
 
In (16) the Null hypothesis emphasizes that there is no auto-
correlation while H1 states that there is some sort of auto-
correlation. The Breusch-Godfrey test needs LM statistic 
which proven to follow χ2 distribution in which k is number 
of auto-correlation lags that we have considered. 
5) Calculate LM statistic as following; 
LM = nR2 ∼  χ2  , n = T − k (17) 
T is the total number of samples. If LM statistic is greater  
than the critical value from χ2 with k degree of freedom, we 
will reject the H0, so there si auto-correlation of K lag in this 
case. If LM statistic is less than critical value from χ2 with k 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [2]-[3]. The test results for DW 
and GB test are listed in Table. [1]. 
B. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 2 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [4]-[5]. The test results for DW 
and GB test are listed in Table. [2]. 
C. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 3 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [6]-[7]. The test results for DW 
and GB test are listed in Table. [3]. 
A. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 1 0  ∀ i = 1, ..., k or R2 > 0 H1 : ρi 
TABLE I 
ISONE CA REAL-TIME PRICE PREDICTION 
 
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
-0.1009 0.023 -4.331 -0.147 -0.055 
F-statistic 18.76 BIC 1.610e+04  
R-squared 0.010 Adj. R-squared 0.010 
Log-Likelihood -8047.6 AIC 1.610e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew 0.291 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 9542.915 Prob (JB) 0.00 
Prob (F-statistic) 1.56e-05 Omnibus 375.380 
Kurtosis 14.187 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  AD decomposition for the Day-ahead prices for Portland. 
 
 
D. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone  4 
 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [8]-[9]. The test results for DW 
and GB test are listed in Table. [4]. 
 
 
TABLE II 
PORTLAND DAY-AHEAD PRICE PREDICTION ERROR 
RTP  Prediction Error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
CONCORD RT DEMAND PREDICTION ERROR 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  MD decomposition for the Day-ahead prices for Portland. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  AD decomposition for the real-time demand for Concord. 
 
 
E. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 5 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [10]-[11]. The test results for 
DW and GB test are listed in Table. [5]. 
 
F. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 6 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [12]-[13]. The test results for 
DW and GB test are listed in Table. [6]. 
 
G. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 7 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [14]-[15]. The test results for 
DW and GB test are listed in Table. [7]. 
 
TABLE IV 
BURLINGTON RT DEMAND PREDICTION ERROR 
 
  
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1453 0.023 6.268 0.100 0.191 
F-statistic 39.29 BIC 2.169e+04  
R-squared 0.021 Adj. R-squared 0.021 
Log-Likelihood -9123.6 AIC 1.825e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew 0.315 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 48.753 Prob (JB) 2.59e-11 
Prob (F-statistic) 4.54e-10 Omnibus 41.952 
Kurtosis 3.494 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1566 0.023 6.765 0.111 0.202 
F-statistic 45.77 BIC 2.169e+04  
R-squared 0.024 Adj. R-squared 0.024 
Log-Likelihood -10843. AIC 2.169e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew 0.346 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 165.852 Prob (JB) 9.68e-37 
Prob (F-statistic) 1.79e-11 Omnibus 87.361 
Kurtosis 4.305 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1258 0.023 5.415 0.080 0.171 
F-statistic 29.32 BIC 1.471e+04  
R-squared 0.016 Adj. R-squared 0.015 
Log-Likelihood -7352.2 AIC 1.471e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew -0.012 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 18831.860 Prob (JB) 0.00 
Prob (F-statistic) 6.93e-08 Omnibus 415.283 
Kurtosis 18.737 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. MD decomposition for the real-time demand for Concord. 
 
 
Fig. 8. AD decomposition for the real-time demand for Burlington. 
 
 
H. Decomposition and Auto-Correlation for Zone 8 
The AD and MD decomposition for electricity prices and 
demands are depicted in Figs. [16]-[17]. The test results for 
DW and GB test are listed in Table. [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE V 
PROVIDENCE RT DEMAND PREDICTION ERROR 
 
Fig. 9.  MD decomposition for the real-time demand for Burlington. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  AD decomposition for the real-time demand for Providence. 
 
 
TABLE VI 
SEMASS RT DEMAND PREDICTION ERROR 
 
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1750 0.023 7.591 0.130 0.220 
F-statistic 57.63 BIC 2.272e+04  
R-squared 0.031 Adj. R-squared 0.030 
Log-Likelihood -11357 AIC 2.272e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew -0.138 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 750.482 Prob (JB) 1.08e-163 
Prob (F-statistic) 5.03e-14 Omnibus 144.916 
Kurtosis 6.129 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. MD decomposition for the real-time demand for Providence. 
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1605 0.023 6.942 0.115 0.206 
F-statistic 48.19 BIC 2.073e+04  
R-squared 0.026 Adj. R-squared 0.025 
Log-Likelihood -10360.3 AIC 2.072e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew -0.078 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 1043.952 Prob (JB) 2.04e-227 
Prob (F-statistic) 5.36e-12 Omnibus 163.949 
Kurtosis 6.702 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
  
Fig. 12.  AD decomposition for the real-time demand for SEMASS. 
 
 
Fig. 13.  MD decomposition for the real-time demand for SEMASS. 
 
 
Fig. 14.  AD decomposition for the real-time demand for Worcester. 
 
 
Fig. 15.  MD decomposition for the real-time demand for Worcester. 
TABLE VII 
WORCESTER RT DEMAND PREDICTION ERROR 
 
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1817 0.023 7.887 0.137 0.227 
F-statistic 62.20 BIC 2.341e+04  
R-squared 0.033 Adj. R-squared 0.032 
Log-Likelihood -11702 AIC 2.341e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew 0.255 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 190.651 Prob (JB) 1.08e-163 
Prob (F-statistic) 5.30e-15 Omnibus 81.973 
Kurtosis 4.499 Cond. No. 1.00 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16.  AD decomposition for the real-time demand for Boston. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17.  MD decomposition for the real-time demand for Boston. 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII 
BOSTON RT DEMAND PREDICTION ERROR 
 
RTP  Prediction Error 
coeff. std err. t [0.025 0.975] 
0.1706 0.023 7.392 0.125 0.216 
F-statistic 54.65 BIC 2.487e+04  
R-squared 0.029 Adj. R-squared 0.029 
Log-Likelihood -12429 AIC 2.486e+04 
Prob (Omnibus) 0.000 Skew 0.152 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 264.073 Prob (JB) 4.54e-58 
Prob (F-statistic) 2.19e-13 Omnibus 86.875 
Kurtosis 4.839 Cond. No. 1.00 
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